Our Tsunami Lessons blog was started one week after the 2004 Indonesian tsunami. Here’s a one-sentence summary of the three years of posts you’ll find there:
Scientists at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) knew enough to
want to alert the region’s population of their peril, but they had never rehearsed a way to do so.
They didn't have a plan.
After three years of investigation, our conclusion at Tsunami Lessons was that as a consequence of that lack of preparation, upwards of a quarter million people died.
Now comes the Samoa earthquake and tsunami, and again people died. It’s legitimate to ask once more what it was exactly that PTWC scientists did, who they informed and when, and how and whether their presumably improved warning protocols did any good.
It’s possible the wave followed the earthquake so quickly that no warning reached people in time, but based on what we learned after the Indonesian tsunami, the questions need asking.
Here are some of our conclusions following the 2004 tsunami:
• The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center had no standard operating procedure in place to issue an effective alert using the international news media. Even though it was presumed a massive earthquake in the Indonesia region would be sufficient to trigger tsunamis (the 2004 quake measured 9.0), PTWC scientists were helpless to warn people in harm’s way.
• Since worldwide telegraph, radio and television transmissions have been in place for generations, the PTWC could have alerted populations in the tsunami zone by having procedures in place to “flash” media messages to the affected region.
That didn’t happen, and for an almost incomprehensible reason:
According to the Charles McCreery, the Center’s director, the National Weather Service won’t even allow the PTWC to call the news media. The media have to come to the PTWC. That prohibition requires a thorough review, since it may be the reason tens of thousands of people died in 2004.
• Protocols endorsed by the United Nations require the PTWC to work through government agencies when a tsunami is forecast to arrive in the government’s jurisdiction.
In other words, a government agency “middle man” is built into the warning system, even though this requirement almost guarantees delay in delivering the warning to the affected population.
This point is made clear in virtually every Tsunami Bulletin issued by the PTWC. Here’s a portion from one of the Bulletins issued on September 29 during the Samoa tsunami incident:
THIS BULLETIN IS ISSUED AS ADVICE TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. ONLY NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE DECISIONS REGARDING THE OFFICIAL STATE OF ALERT IN THEIR AREA AND ANY ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN RESPONSE.
This must change. As we repeatedly urged in the original Tsunami Lessons blog (see particularly the 2005 posts), all parties involved in the warning chain must recognize that nothing short of the fastest possible warning is acceptable.
The electronic media are the means to deliver the fastest possible warning. Government agencies of various levels of competence must not be inserted between the PTWC and the people in peril.
The United Nations has it in its power to convene yet another of its many conferences to address this undeniable point: People continue to die during tsunamis despite huge expenditures in the warning networks.
If relinquishing local “authority” can save lives, it must happen.
NOTE: if readers have any personal knowledge of how and whether the broadcast media were used to warn residents in Samoa about the tsunami, please include that information in a comment, below. Was a warning broadcast on the radio or TV before the waves arrived? What warning methods were employed?